Court's ruling. 11 While some disagreement exists concerning Dodd-Frank's actual effect on public suits, 12 this question is ancillary to the issue of its effect on private suits. 13 In order to fully understand the consequences of this recent legislation on the current state of the law and its extraterritorial application in private suits, it is helpful to first consider the standard applicable to public suits-although this standard is not necessarily binding on private suits. 14 Dodd-Frank requires that the SEC conduct a study regarding the appropriate standard for private suits and report the results to Congress, which must then determine whether or not to draft legislation to address the issue. 15 At the outset of this note, Part II provides a brief overview of the Exchange Act provisions at issue and the treatment of transnational securities actions by courts prior to the Morrison decision. Part III discusses the Morrison decision, specifically the reasoning behind the approach chosen by the Court and the competing claims at the time of the decision. In Part IV of this note, the provisions of Dodd-Frank relating to extraterritorial application of United States securities laws are analyzed and discussed in light of their potential impact to this issue. Included in Part IV is a general analysis of the dispute regarding the effect of Dodd-Frank on public suits, the treatment of these suits moving forward, and the effect (or lack thereof) of this dispute on the law governing private suits. Part V discusses the future of extraterritorial application of the securities laws in private suits. Specifically, an analysis of the method of SEC investigation is presented, followed by a discussion of the likely result of that investigation. While this discussion illustrates that a strong possibility exists that the SEC will recommend 11 Dodd-Frank Act § § 929P, 929Y. 12 Section 929P explicitly provides jurisdiction to United States courts for public actions, but many believe that the courts already had jurisdiction over such actions, and that Dodd-Frank does not solve the problem that prevented the courts from hearing these actions-the merits of such claims. Compare, e.g., Painter, supra note 3 (discussing concerns with the effects of § 929P), and George T. Conway, Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-afterdodd-frank/ (claiming that § 929P has no practical effect as written), with Zinn, supra note 3 (acknowledging § 929P as instituting a new standard for public actions and ignoring concerns regarding effectiveness), and MATTHEW BENDER TREATISE ON SECURITIES PRACTICE, 1-1 Securities Practice Guide § 1.01 (Lorraine Massaro & Robert P. Zinn eds., 2010). 13 Commentators appear to agree on the fact that the rule announced in Morrison will stand for private suits until such time as the SEC announces its findings under § 929Y and Congress chooses whether to act. Zinn, supra note 3. 14 
See id.
15 Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(c).
the current "transactional" test as the method of dealing with private actions, Part V concludes with a proposal in support of extending the standard applicable to public actions, the modified "conduct and effects" standard, to private actions. Lastly, Part VI summarizes the state of the law and the theories advanced within this note.
II. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND PRE-MORRISON APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The Exchange Act, in relevant part, prohibits "manipulative or deceptive devices" related to the purchase or sale of securities.
16 Section10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits devices that violate SEC rules and regulations, specifically Rule 10b-5, which regulates actions that have the effect of defrauding investors or misstating or omitting material facts regarding the purchase or sale of securities.
17
Certain provisions of the Exchange Act have been interpreted to suggest extraterritorial application, but there is no explicit language authorizing such reach. 18 When also considering the general presumption that U.S. law does not 16 17 Rule 10b-5 makes it "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . , or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 18 See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Court in Morrison discussed previous approaches of lower courts based on certain language of the antifraud provisions that were said to imply extraterritorial application, but the majority rejected such implications and relied on the lack of an explicit grant of extraterritorial application by Congress. 130 S. Ct. at 2882. The Morrison concurrence was more accepting to such an implication because "[t]he text and history of § 10(b) are famously opaque on the question of when, exactly, transnational securities frauds fall within the statute's compass." Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring).
apply without its borders, 19 the extraterritorial reach of these basic antifraud provisions in transnational securities actions has been the subject of much debate.
20
Prior to the Morrison case, lower courts utilized various approaches to determine whether these antifraud provisions should apply to private transnational securities actions, many of which appeared to be primarily foreign-based claims.
21
The most common, and most often cited, of these approaches were the "conduct" test and the "effects" test. 22 Developed by the Second Circuit, these tests were generally justified by the view that § 10(b) was silent as to extraterritorial reach, so the question became whether a court believed that the disputes were of great enough importance to the United States to justify the investment of resources by the legal system. Court hailed this new standard as a way of eliminating the uncertainty that the application of the conduct and effects tests had created in the outcomes of transnational securities actions while maintaining both the congressional intent of the antifraud provisions and the canon of statutory interpretation against extraterritoriality.
41

IV. NOT SO FAST: CONGRESS ADDRESSES THE MATTER (SOMEWHAT) DIRECTLY
The ink barely had time to dry on the Court's Morrison opinion, an exercise of judicial authority intended to set the standard for debate regarding transnational securities actions, before Congress decided to take up the issue directly. Less than a month after the Morrison decision came down, Dodd-Frank passed Congress and was signed into law by President Barack Obama. 42 The broad scope of the Act extends investor protections and institutes measures for reform of many publicly traded companies. 43 More importantly for purposes of the issue at hand, the secondary provisions of § § 929P and 929Y of the Act are aimed at expanding extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions contained in the securities laws. 44 46 Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to "solicit public comment and thereafter conduct a study" to determine the extent the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act should extend to private actions covering the same situations as § 929P(b).
The express grant of jurisdiction to United States courts contained in § 929P for public actions is undisputed. However, the effect of this provision is far from certain. On its face, the provision appears to permit claims in situations that fall under what amounts to the modified "conduct and effects" test proposed for public actions in the United States' amicus brief in Morrison. 47 Application of this standard to public actions only is in line with what the SEC proposed to Congress while Dodd-Frank was being developed, suggesting the maintenance of a higher standard for private actions. 48 The intent of Congress to achieve this result for public actions appears in the legislative history. 49 The dispute arises from many who claim that the language of § 929P, which grants jurisdiction to the district courts, renders the provision essentially ineffective. 
antifraud provisions, thus rendering § 929P ineffective and inconsequential.
51
Others have chosen to adopt the stance that § 929P does provide extraterritorial application in public actions, emphasizing the clear congressional intent over this allegedly ineffective plain meaning of the provision.
52
While the debate regarding public actions could be resolved by a variety of methods, the most likely being judicial decisions interpreting § 929P or congressional action altering the language or effect of the provision, the future of private actions under § 929Y is at once more and less discernable. What appears certain is that the SEC study mandated by § 929Y will be conducted with the goal of determining the most appropriate standard for extraterritoriality in private actions. Dodd-Frank sets the guidelines for the content of this study, which should encompass the scope of private actions that should be permitted under the standard, the implications of the application of such a standard on international comity, 53 the economic costs and benefits of the potential standards, and the possibility of adopting a narrower standard than that applied under § 929P. 54 Also, Dodd-Frank includes a requirement that this SEC study be submitted to Congress within eighteen months of the passage of the Act, at which time the recommendations discerned from the study must also be made. The immediate discussion concerning the extraterritoriality provisions of Dodd-Frank has been dominated by the dispute regarding public actions and § 929P. 57 There is no doubt that this focus has been well placed, considering § 929P purports to have an immediate effect on transnational securities actions. In comparison, the potential effects of § 929Y likely will not even begin to be realized until the eighteen-month period allotted for the SEC study has concluded. Even then, the very real possibility exists that the standard will remain unaltered and Morrison will continue to control. However, the importance of whatever standard is deemed appropriate to transnational securities claims by investors cannot be denied. If the Morrison interpretation stands, numerous investors will be left without redress in American courts, which are often the only forum in which such actions are available.
58 Public companies could possibly be emboldened with the idea of a lower level of accountability for fraudulent behavior. 59 In contrast, a broader standard for extraterritoriality in private suits would likely create considerable costs for United States investors, businesses, and the court system. deserve more consideration than currently available. The remainder of this note attempts to provide such consideration of § 929Y through an analysis of the standard likely to be recommended by the SEC after its study, as well as a discussion of why this standard is not in fact the best solution to the issue of extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions in private actions. 57 See, e.g., Zinn, supra note 3; Painter, supra note 3; Conway, supra note 12; Davidoff, supra note 51. In order to fully understand the debate on the appropriate standard for private transnational securities actions, it is important to realize the nature of these claims. In the transnational context, private claims arise in F-Cubed and "F-Squared" situations. 62 Although not expressly authorized by the Exchange Act, a general private action has been implied from § 10b and Rule 10b-5. 63 Due to the implied nature of this right of action, courts have read additional requirements into the statutory framework for private plaintiffs wishing to pursue a claim. 64 In addition to the substantive requirements, a private claim must establish the elements of reliance, economic loss, and causation. 65 These judicially created, private actionspecific elements have often been cited as justification for instituting and upholding a higher standard for extraterritorial application of the securities laws in private actions.
66
In the search for the appropriate standard for extraterritorial application of the securities laws to private transnational actions, certain policy considerations perpetuate the discussion. The main policy concerns are as follows: international comity, resource allocation, efficiency, investor protection, and availability of remedies.
67 Virtually any discussion of extraterritoriality of the securities laws is incomplete without an analysis of the effects a given approach has on these policy concerns. Notably, such policy concerns are a significant, if not the primary, factor in the distinction between F-Squared actions, where the involvement of United 62 The distinction between the two types of private transnational claims exists in the plaintiff party or class. F-Squared actions are brought by entirely domestic plaintiff(s), while F-Cubed actions are instituted by wholly or partly foreign plaintiff(s States investors lends stronger justification for application of the United States securities laws, and F-Cubed actions, where the policy concerns are often used to reject extraterritoriality where foreign investors are involved. 68 Recognizing the importance of these specific policy concerns, the SEC explicitly instructed those submitting comments under the § 929Y study to include discussion of the potential effects of proposed standards for private actions on such policy concerns.
69
The two most commonly cited standards for application to private transnational securities claims, the transactional test as announced in Morrison and the modified conduct-and-effects test as announced for public actions in § 929P of Dodd-Frank, are discussed at length throughout this note. 70 While it is possible to approach the issue of private actions by considering only these two standards, a thorough analysis should at least acknowledge the potential alternatives. In its amicus brief in Morrison, the United States first announced its recommended standard for private suits, which required a heightened level of conduct from public suits. 71 This "direct injury" standard remains a viable alternative that must be considered along with the other potential standards. Another possible approach is to deny application of the securities laws to private transnational securities actions, leaving enforcement solely to the SEC and international suits. Although this approach has not received much support, it is theoretically possible, especially considering the implied nature of the private actions and the strong policy concerns present. 72 Lastly, there exists some support for an intermediate standard that would allow a private action to be brought by United States investors under the modified conduct-and-effects test, but not in F-Cubed situations, regardless of the relevant conduct or effects.
73
B. The SEC Study: The Comments Are in, Now It Is the SEC's Move
As part of the § 929Y study, the SEC solicited comments from any interested parties regarding their opinions on the appropriate standard to be presented to Congress in January 2012. After setting a deadline of February 18, 2011 for receipt 68 See, e.g., Kantor, supra note 5, at 841, 871-72. 70 See supra Parts II & III. 71 Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 25-28. 72 See supra notes 63-69. 73 See infra note 78. of these comments, the SEC received fifty-one submissions from interested parties. 74 The parties offering comments included multiple foreign governments, the United States Chamber of Commerce, numerous public pension funds and investment houses, various law firms, a group of forty-two law professors, other academics, and an individual who had been personally harmed by securities fraud. 75 The recommendations in the comment letters can be grouped into three general categories. 82 Id. at 13-14. 83 See Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 6. 84 See infra Part V.C. approximately one half of the remaining comment letters 86 and is the standard the SEC is most likely to recommend. As expected, this approach was advocated by all of the foreign governments that submitted comment letters on the subject.
87
Additionally, other notable parties supporting maintenance of the transactional test in their comment letters include the United States Chamber of Commerce, the European Union, and the international law firm White & Case LLP. 88 After consideration of the policy rationale behind this approach, as well as the identities of the proponents of such an approach, it becomes evident why it would be the preferred, and therefore the most likely, approach to be recommended by the SEC under § 929Y.
The primary policy rationale in support of the maintenance of the transactional test is the same concern for international comity and sovereignty of foreign nations that was previously announced by the Supreme Court in Morrison. 89 87 For an entire list of these foreign governments, which includes France, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, see id.
88 Id. 89 See Gov't of the U.K. Comments, supra note 76, at 2-4; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 2-4, 10-22. States model for class action suits. 92 The SEC, as a government agency, must remain acutely aware of the concerns of foreign nations in order to preserve relationships with other governments. The need for preservation of such relationships, from both a governmental policy and a practical perspective, is magnified in a field such as securities law where solely domestic issues are becoming increasingly less common. 93 In the United States amicus brief endorsed by the SEC in Morrison, the Commission stressed the greater comity concerns presented by private actions while noting that such concerns were lessened or absent in the case of public actions. 94 While the issue of international comity and the concerns of foreign nations are not determinative for the SEC's recommendation, their role in the decision-making process is undeniable.
Another significant policy consideration that factors into the determination of the applicable standard for private actions is a result of the explicit grant of authority for public actions in § 929P. 95 By reaffirming the authority of the SEC and DOJ to institute public actions, Congress has assured the SEC that its power will subsist no matter what standard is adopted for private actions. The parties supporting the transactional test in their comment letters appear notably more confident in the effect of public enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws than the parties suggesting alternative standards. 96 The United "far-reaching and potent," 97 while the government of the United Kingdom classifies the ability to bring public actions as "the necessary powers to pursue cross-border securities fraud." 98 An SEC view of its own enforcement powers would presumably be comparable to these descriptions, as the Commission has previously endorsed its preference for public actions over private actions. 99 With such a positive view of the effectiveness of public actions in deterrence of securities fraud, the risks of rejecting expansion of the scope of private actions in order to address the international comity concerns appear minimal.
The justification for the transactional test also includes consideration of the cost-benefit analysis, as instructed under § 929Y. 100 According to proponents of this approach, the potential benefits of instituting a broader standard for private actions are generally limited to better compensation for injured investors, a benefit that appears unnecessary when viewed in light of the claimed effectiveness of public actions. 101 This potential benefit appears even less significant when one is reminded that investors who purchase securities on United States exchanges are still afforded the ability to pursue a private action. pension funds, various other institutional investors, and the National Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys. 110 The superior level of investor protection and fraud deterrence offered by application of the modified conduct-and-effects test in § 929P to private actions is both desirable and attainable. The protection offered by public actions alone is insufficient, 111 and the international comity concerns with instituting such a standard, while present, are inflated by proponents of the transactional test. 112 And while certain increased costs would be an unavoidable reality in instituting a broader private action, the benefit of significant protection for investors cannot be outweighed by frugality. Although unlikely to prevail as the Commission's recommended standard or as the standard ultimately adopted by Congress, the extension of the § 929P standard to private actions remains the most appropriate approach.
The extension of the § 929P standard to private actions would allow the SEC and private litigants to achieve enhanced results in the deterrence of fraud and protection of investors. 113 This complimentary relationship, in which the United
States is enforcing the public interest while private litigants are actively seeking compensation for harm, is a far more effective approach than conferring sole enforcement power on the limited resources of the government. 114 Even if one accepts the claims by proponents of the transactional test that SEC enforcement is more effective than private action, 115 there is no substitute for the deterrent effect from the potential for enhanced liability through a broader private action. 116 Under the current standard, a company can take solace in the frightening truth that it can only be held liable under the antifraud provisions of the United States securities laws if its securities are listed on a domestic exchange, its securities are part of a domestic purchase, or its actions are so detrimental or offensive that the SEC chooses to apply its limited resources to institute a suit. Those who support maintenance of the current standard frame this issue as a positive aspect, as it allays the fears of foreign companies that they will be somewhat unknowingly subjected to a suit under United States securities laws. 117 Unfortunately, in promoting this desirable but secondary benefit, the current standard is performing inadequately in achieving the primary goal of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 118 By extending the scope of private actions under the modified conduct-and-effects test, the focus would be appropriately returned to the deterrence of fraud and protection of investors.
The most common justification for rejection of an extension of the scope of private actions is the international comity concerns that arise from extraterritorial application of the securities laws. 119 The general approach advanced by foreign nations, as shown by the comment letters submitted to the SEC, 120 is overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining the current limited standard of extraterritorial application. However, any assumption that a comparable private action standard to § 929P is so contrary to international comity as to require rejection of such a standard is premature. It is important for one to remember that the effect of § 929P is to institute a modified conduct-and-effects test for public actions. 121 By extending this standard to private actions, the ability of private litigants to bring primarily foreign-based suits would remain limited to instances of significant domestic conduct or substantial domestic effects. 122 Such a standard does not implicate the concerns assumed to be inherent in the original, broad conduct and effects tests. 123 The narrower scope of this test ensures that a material component of the fraud, in the form of either significant conduct or foreseeable substantial effects, is domestic and thus does not raise the same policy concerns as 117 E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 4, 33-38. 118 See supra notes 113-14. 119 See supra notes 89-94. 120 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
121 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
122 Id.; see also NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, at 5. 123 See NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, at 5-7 (explaining why "international relations will not be disturbed by allowing private investors to pursue securities fraud claims in the limited situations involving transnational fraud . . . when significant conduct occurs in the United States or has substantial effects on investors in the United States"); Superannuation Fund Comments, supra note 85, at 10-13.
pure extraterritorial application of United States laws. 124 As such, the minimized comity concerns must be balanced with the enhanced investor protection and deterrence benefits.
Additionally, those with concerns surrounding the effects of a broader standard for private actions on foreign nations must also consider the related issue that a comparable standard to § 929P would permit private actions that are not limited to United States investors. 125 All nations, albeit to varying degrees, possess and pursue an interest in deterrence of securities fraud and protection of investors. 126 By expanding the scope of the private right of action to that of § 929P, the United States would not be sacrificing the sovereignty of foreign nations for the sake of compensating its own investors, but rather providing remedies for both foreign and domestic investors for harm caused by fraudulent activities with an adequate level of connection to the United States. 127 To ensure the adequacy of this connection, Congress has chosen language instituting the modified conduct-andeffects standard over the original. 128 When the potential inadequacy of available remedies for both domestic and foreign investors abroad is also considered, 129 the extension of private right of action is revealed as a necessary method of promoting and enforcing an international goal rather than an infringement on principles of international comity and sovereignty.
130 124 It is important to distinguish that while nations ideally would like their laws to apply in most, if not all situations, true international comity concerns in this area arise from attempted application of United States laws where there is an insufficient connection to the United States. So, while the foreign nations' comment letters logically support the transactional test as an opportunity to have claims arise only under their law for a greater number of disputes, the true comity concern is not evident in permitting any claims beyond those permitted by such a test. For discussion of why these comity concerns are lessened by this narrow scope, see sources cited supra note 123.
125 Contra supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 126 This policy concern and the methods of enforcement are discussed throughout the comment letters submitted to the SEC. See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 74. 127 See supra note 123. See also DRRT Comments, supra note 112; London Pensions Fund Comments, supra note 96, at 2 ("Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.").
128 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P. For a discussion of this modified standard, see Brief for the United States, supra note 36. 129 See NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, at 24-30; DRRT Comments, supra note 112, at 3. 130 See NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, at 8-10.
transnational securities actions, whether public or private, would be governed by one common standard rather than the current dual-standard approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act is a complicated issue that affects numerous constituents and, not surprisingly, is the subject of passionate disagreement. The issue appeared sufficiently settled by years of analysis by the circuit courts but was upended by the Morrison decision, which was subsequently altered by Dodd-Frank. Unfortunately, the state of private transnational securities actions will not be settled until well after the January 2012 deadline for the § 929Y SEC study. At the present time, the SEC study appears likely to include a recommendation for the maintenance of the transactional test as the standard for private actions, based on conceptions of international comity concerns and the sufficiency of public action under § 929P. However, this recommendation should place proper emphasis on the goals of investor protection and fraud deterrence, and recommend extension of the § 929P standard and its modified conduct-and-effects test to private actions in lieu of the transactional test.
